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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
JACOB B. LOVELESS, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
CaseNo.20070419-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdiction authority is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
§78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
May a trial court accept a defendant's plea to an alternative charge over the 
prosecutor objection? Does the prosecution have the authority to force a defendant to 
trial where the defendant accepts responsibility for one of two offenses charged in the 
alternative? 
Standard of Review. The appellate court reviews a trial court acceptance or 
rejection of a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Turner, 980 
P.2d 1188 (Utah App. 1998). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, RULES, ETC. 
U.C. A. § 76-5-103. Aggravated Assault 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) Intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another, or, 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (1) 
(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-5-601 or other means or force 
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Section (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
U.C.A. § 76-5-112 Reckless Endangerment 
(1) A person commits reckless endangerment if, under circumstances not 
amounting to a felony offense, the person recklessly engages in conduct that creates a 
substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person. 
(2) Reckless endangerment is a class A misdemeanor. 
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U.C.A. § 77-8a-l(l) 
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the same 
indictment or information if each offense is a separate count and if the charges are: 
(a) based upon the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in 
their commission; or 
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan. 
U.C.A. § 77-13-3 
A plea of no contest may be entered by the accused only upon approval of the 
court and only after due consideration of the views of the parties and the interest of 
the public in the effective administration of justice. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 31, 2004, Defendant was at a gathering with a number of friends in the 
Payson canyon. Defendant arrived at the camp area where the gathering was already 
in progress in the late evening hours. There was a campfire area where several of ttie 
group had gathered. Defendant had a fire arm with him and shortly after his arrival, 
he and some of the others present took turns firing the weapon into a wooded area 
away from the campfire. Tran. 3/2/05, p. 9. Sometime later, the complaining witness 
took his sleeping bag and went out away from the campfire area into an area where 
there were several tree stumps. Tran. 3/2/05, p. 10. He then got into the sleeping bag 
and lay on the ground. Tran. 3/2/05, p. 26. Appellee was not aware that the 
complaining witness had left the area of the campfire and the rest of the group. He 
had some rounds left in the firearm and decided to empty the weapon before putting it 
back in his vehicle by firing at what appeared to be stumps. After he fired a round, he 
heard a moan and ran to the object he had thought to be a stump, finding the 
complaining witness to have been wounded. Tran. 3/2/05, p. 32-33. Appellee and 
some of the others loaded the complaining witness into appellee's vehicle and 
appellee drove the complaining witness to the hospital in Payson, Utah. 
On August 18, 2004, the State filed an Information charging with one count of 
Reckless Endangerment in violation of U.C.A. § 76-5-112, a class A misdemeanor 
and one count charging a violation of U.C.A. § 76-10-528, a class B misdemeanor. R. 
001. On October 25, 2004, appellee was arraigned on the Information filed and 
entered a plea of not guilty. R. 014. At that arraignment, a pretrial conference was set 
for November 9, 2004. Appellee appeared and a pretrial conference was set for 
December 9, 2004. R. 018. Appellee appeared on December 9, 2004, at the pretrial 
conference at which time the court set the matter for jury trial to begin on March 23, 
2005. R. 021. On January 12, 2005, the State filed an Amended Information 
containing two counts. The first count charged appellee in the alternative with 
violating U.C.A. § 76-5-103, Aggravated Assault, or U.C.A. § 76-5-112, Reckless 
Endangerment. The second count charged appellee with a violation of § 76-10- 528, 
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon While Under the Influence. R. 025. A felony 
first appearance was held on the Amended Information and preliminary hearing was 
held on March 2,2005. R. 032. 
Following the preliminary hearing, the court bound the appellee over for trial. 
Appellee filed a motion to quash the bind over. R.045. Following briefing and oral 
argument, on June 16, 2005, the court denied appellee's motion to quash as to the 
two alternative offenses in Count 1 of the Information, but granted the motion as to 
Count 2 of the Information, Possession of a Dangerous Weapon While Under the 
Influence. R, 077. 
Following the resolution of other pretrial motions, the matter was set for jury 
trial on the remaining charges in Count 1 to begin on April 10, 2007. On April 6, 
2007, Defendant filed a Notice of Intent to Enter Plea of Guilty to Count 1, Reckless 
Endangerment. R. 431. On April 9, 2007, the State objected to the entry of 
Defendant's plea. Following oral argument, the court denied the objection of the 
State to the entry of the plea of guilty to the alternative charge. The State then moved 
to dismiss the alternative offense of reckless endangerment. Following oral 
argument, the court denied the State's motion to dismiss. R. 476: 19-21; R. 434-
33.On April 10, 2007, the State filed a Motion to Reconsider. Following oral 
argument, the court denied the motion. On May 1, 2007, the court entered Findings 
of Fact and an Order allowing the appellee to enter a plea of guilty to Reckless 
Endangerment and an Order denying the State's Motion to Reconsider. The court 
also entered an Order staying proceedings pending the State's filing a petition for 
interlocutory appeal. R. 474. On May 21, 2007, the State filed a Petition for 
Interlocutory Appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
While a prosecutor certainly has discretion in determining whether to file and 
what charges to file, where two separate offenses are alleged in the same count of an 
Information as alternative offenses, the prosecution cannot force a defendant to trial 
where the defendant chooses to accept responsibility for one of the alternative 
offenses. The trial court in did not abuse discretion by allowing the Defendant to 
accept responsibility by pleading to one of the alternatives as filed. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ALLOWING THE DEFENDANT TO PLEAD GUILTY TO ONE OF 
TWO ALTERNATIVE OFFENSES PLEAD AS ONE COUNT. 
Much of appellant's brief deals with the claim that the prosecution has 
discretion as to what charges are filed, how they are plead and whether or not a case 
is plea bargained. Appellee does not dispute this claim. A prosecutor certainly has 
the discretion described above. In this case, the prosecutor had the power to file the 
case initially as a single charge of Reckless Endangerment and then, well prior to 
trial, to amend the Information and file the two-count Amended Information filed in 
this case. The prosecutor had the authority to choose to file in the alternative, 
alleging that the Defendant either committed the offense of Aggravated Assault or the 
offense of Reckless Endangerment. Appellee does not agree that the prosecution has 
the power or the discretion to determine what plea a defendant will eater to a charge 
or the power to force a defendant to a jury trial where the defendant chooses to accept 
responsibility for one of the two alternatives. 
The appellant bases its argument on the decision in State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 
1188 (1998).1 Appellee argues that Turner does not control this case and that the trial 
court appropriately distinguished the circumstances of Turner from those of the 
present case. In Turner, the Information filed included two offenses filed in separate 
counts, Count 1, Negligent Homicide and Count II, Driving Left of Center. At the 
time of arraignment, the defendant pled not guilty to Count 1 and guilty to Count It. 
980 P.2d at 1189. The two offenses were not pled as alternative offenses as they are 
1
 Appellant's opening brief, p. 5. 
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in the present case, but separate counts. The jury could have found the defendant 
guilty of both offenses. One of the offenses in Turner was found to be a lesser 
included offense to the other. Under Turner, the State does have a right to have a jury 
consider all of the separate counts of an Information, including lesser included 
offenses filed as separate counts in the Information. 2 In the present case, the 
appellant has argued that whether or not Reckless Endangerment is a lesser included 
offense to Aggravated Assault, the distinction is irrelevant. 3Appellee would argue 
that Reckless Endangerment is not a necessarily lesser included offense to 
Aggravated Assault, but would agree that it is not relevant whether or not there is 
such a relationship between the two offenses. 
The distinction that does matter is that both offenses in the present case were 
charged in a single count and that the State did not have a right to have the Defendant 
convicted of both offenses. Appellant takes the position that the trial court's 
decision in allowing the appellee to plead to an alternative charge forced the State to 
make an election and took away the State's right to try a defendant in the alternative. 
2
 However, Turner, did recognize that a defendant can be punished under only one 
provision of the law where one offense charged is a lesser included offense of another. 
Turner, 980P.2dat 1191. 
3
 Appellant's opening brief, p. 7. 
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4
 The appellant cites State v. Butler, 560 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1977) in support of this 
position. The defendant in Butler was charged with a single count of Manslaughter. 
In the single count, the Information set forth the full manslaughter statute alleging 
that the defendant violated the statute under one of the three subsections of the 
statute. The defendant argued that the State was required to elect as to which of the 
three alternatives within the statute the defendant was to be tried. 560 P.2d at 1138. 
Butler stands for the proposition that the State can file alternative theories as to how 
the conduct of a defendant, violates a statute without electing a specific subsection. 
Butler does not stand for the proposition that where the State files alternative statutes 
in the same count of the Information, the defendant is prohibited from accepting 
responsibility for either of the alternatives set forth by the State. Clearly, if the 
defendant in Butler had tendered his plea to any one of the three subsections of the 
manslaughter statute, it cannot be argued that the court's acceptance of the plea was 
an abuse of discretion, or that the State had the right to have a jury determine which 
of the three alternatives the defendant had violated. 
The appellant has also cited State v. Montoya, 910 P.2d 929 (Utah 1996), for 
the proposition that the State has the authority to charge a defendant in the 
4
 Ibid. p. 7. 
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alternative.5 Appellant does not now, nor has he in the past, challenged the manner in 
which the State has plead in this case. The position taken by the appellee, and that 
taken by the trial court is that when the State pleads in the alternative, a defendant can 
decide to accept responsibility for one of the alternatives without being forced to 
endure the rigors, and expense of allowing a jury to determine whether or not he is 
guilty of a criminal violation, and if so, which of the alternative statutes defendant has 
violated. To do so under the circumstances of this case not only is prejudicial to a 
defendant, but also is not in the furtherance of judicial economy. None of the cases 
cited by the appellant support the argument that by pleading to an alternative charge 
the defendant has deprived the State of some right to trial or of the right to control the 
prosecution of a criminal case. 
In Montoya, the State had filed a charge of Aggravated Assault and a charge of 
Incest originally as separate counts and then as alternative charges. The defendant 
objected to the charges being filed in the alternative based upon the claim that the 
offenses represented repugnant theories. The trial court denied his claim. 910 P.2d at 
444. Montoya entered a conditional plea to Incest and appealed the issue. On appeal 
the appellate court upheld the trial court ruling and let stand the conditional plea of 
5
 Appellant's opening brief, p. 8. 
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the defendant. 910 P.2d at 446. The case does not stand for the proposition that a trial 
court cannot accept the plea of a defendant to one alternative over another. 
Nor does State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995), or State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 
390 (Utah 1989), preclude a defendant from pleading guilty to an alternative charge 
or give the power to the State to determine whether or not a case goes to trial or a 
defendant pleads guilty. 
Nor does State v. Studham, 655 P.2d 669 (1982) have any relevance to the facts 
of this case. Studham applies for the proposition that if a case is to be tried, a 
defendant cannot waive the jury without the consent of the prosecution and approval 
of the court. 655 P.2d at 671. It does not establish a right of the State to consent to 
the entry of defendant's guilty plea. Where a defendant tenders a plea to a charge, 
only the court can reject the plea and then only under certain conditions, none of 
which require the consent of the State. 
The appellant also agrees with the proposition in Turner that a judge has the 
right, and in some cases the obligation to remse a guilty plea. However, the refusal of 
a guilty plea must be based upon some legally relevant factor. Generally, under the 
provisions of U.C.A § 77-13-1, there are five kinds of pleas that may be entered to an 
Information: not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, and guilty 
n 
and mentally ill. U.C.A. § 77-13-3 and Rule 11(c) provide that a plea of no contest is 
the only plea that requires court approval prior to being entered by the court. Rule 
11(b) provides that a defendant may enter one of the other pleas and in the event the 
defendant does refuse to plea, the court may enter a plea of not guilty. 
Rule 11(e) provides that a court may not accept a plea until the court has found 
that the defendant is aware and affirmatively waives the rights set forth in Rule 11 (e) 
(l)-(8). The State does not claim that any of the conditions that must be met prior to 
the acceptance of a plea under Rule 11 are in question. Even if there was some 
objection, there is no provision or statute that gives the prosecution the veto power 
over defendant's choice of a plea. The State's right is to have a determination made 
as to whether or not a defendant is guilty or not guilty of criminal misconduct. In the 
event the appellee had determined that he wished to accept responsibility for 
Aggravated Assault rather than Reckless Endangerment, under the State's theory of 
the law, the court should not except such a plea, but should force the defendant to go 
to trial to let the jury determine the issue. In the present case, the trial judge 
correctly observed that by exercising his discretion to charge the offenses in the 
alternative, the State took the chance that the Defendant would plead to the lesser 
offense. (R. 476: 19,24. 
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A further reason to uphold the trial court decision in this matter, is the motive 
set forth by the State for amending the original Information and filing, a more serious 
charge as an alternative to the original offense. The appellant ;argues that the 
prosecutor has the discretion to determine what crimes are charged and to determine 
in what manner to prosecute a case 6 However, that does not excuse the prosecutor 
from acting in good faith and not using the position improperly against a defendant. 
Rule 3.8 (a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct provides that the prosecutor 
shall refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by 
probable cause. 
Further, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that the prosecutor's, control of the 
manner in which the prosecution is conducted is not absolute and that due process 
does not allow the prosecution to use the power to dismiss and refile charges to harass 
a defendant. In State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court of 
Utah held that a prosecutor could not refile a charge against a defendant once a 
magistrate had refused to bind over the charge for lack of evidence absent the 
discovery of new evidence unknown to the prosecutor at the time of the preliminary 
6
 Appellant's opening brief, p. 8. 
13 
hearing. 714 P.2d at 647. In response to the State's argument that an accused is 
protected by the good faith of the prosecutor, the Court observed: 
The State vigorously argues that an accused will be 
protected from harassment by the good faith of the 
prosecutor. However, the courts have had occasion to 
scrutinize the exercise of the broad discretion accorded 
prosecutors, and that scrutiny has revealed t h a t t h e 
prosecutor's good faith is a fragile protection for the 
accused. Numerous courts have noted the potential for 
abuse inherent in the power to refile charges. 714 P.2dat 
647. 
The Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution as well as Article I Section 
7 of the Utah State Constitution guarantee the right to a defendant in a criminal case 
to fundamental fairness 
Of concern in the present case is the motive of the State in filing the Amended 
Information raising the stakes for the Defendant. At the close of the oral argument to 
the trial court the following discussion between the court and counsel took place: 
Mr. Kennard: And well, and your Honor, I don't know. I'm going to look 
possibly at doing like an interlocutory appeal. I don't know if I can do it. I'm really 
confused at how we're going to get facts to support the charge, given that the State's 
14 
going to allege that somebody was assaulted. [ know that the defendant's not going 
to be willing to plead to that. So I don't know how the Court's going to take 
sufficient facts for the entry of the plea, but it's complicated. It's going to possibly 
b e -
The Court: Well, Counsel, you charged it. 
Mr. Esplin: Yeah. 
Mr. Kennard: Well, your Honor-
The Court: You ought to have the facts if you charged it. 
Mr. Kennard: Well, I know, but the Court has to have facts to take the plea. 
So I guess the - 1 guess the defendant can plead, but I just say we might be— 
The Court: What are your facts-
Mr. Kennard: —we might be look-
The Court: —what would the[y] be if you allege them/ 
Mr. Esplin: Well, that he would admit to accept responsibility for recklessly 
discharging a firearm - or discharging - causing injury - serious bodily injury to the 
defendant - or to the victim. 
The Court: Created a-1 mean, he recklessly — 
Mr. Esplin: Created a circ— 
The Court: -engaged in conduct. 
Mr. Esplin: Right. 
The Court: That would be shooting. That created a substantial risk of death or 
seriously injury to another person — serious bodily injury to another person. 
Mr. Kennard: And we're going to object to those facts, but your Honor, I 
know it's complicated. I'm going to look at an interlocutory appeal. 
The Court: You filed the charge. 
Mr. Kennard: And your Honor— 
The Court: How can you object to those facts? 
Mr. Kennard: -and respectfully, the Court made the wrong decision, 
respectfully, because-
The Court: I understand that, but you filed the charge. What did you expect to 
prove? 
Mr. Kennard: I expected to prove that he assaulted someone, your Honor, is 
what I expected to prove. So— 
The Court: Then why did you file the alternative charge? 
15 
Mr. Kennard: Because the defendant wouldn't plead to the lesser charge 
originally, your Honor. 
The Court: Then I'm afraid you're getting what you deserve. R476 pp.22-24. 
Appellee claims that the conduct and the motive of the prosecution in filing 
and then amending to a more serious offense based upon the fact that appellee entered 
a plea of not guilty to the original charge constitutes an act of bad faith. If, as the 
prosecutor claimed, the State was aware or of the opinion that there was not sufficient 
evidence to support a charge of Reckless Endangerment and proceeded to prosecute 
on that charge, that conduct is directly prohibited by Rule 3.8. On the other hand, if 
the Reckless Endangerment charge was filed under the belief that there was probable 
cause to file that charge and then, for purpose of supporting the State's legal 
position, the State claimed that the evidence was insufficient to establish that charge, 
then the State is not being forthright with the court. In either case, Appellee argues 
that neither statutes nor rules support the right of the State to prosecute in that 
manner. Such conduct violates the constitutional guarantee of fundamental fairness 
by using prosecutorial power in an improper manner. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, appellee respectfully requests the Court uphold the 
trial court order in this matter and remand the case for the entry of Defendant's plea 
of guilty to the charge of Reckless Endangerment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of January, 2008. 
MICHAEL D. £SPLIN 
Attorney for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 31st day of January, 2008,1 served two copies of 
the Brief of Respondent upon the plaintiff/appellant, State of Utah, by causing them 
to be delivered by first class mail to counsel of record as follows: 
JEFFERY S. GRAY 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARKL. SHURTLIFF 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P. O. Box 140S54 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
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ADDENDUM 
UCA §76-5-103 
UCA §76-5-112 
UCA §76-10-528 
UCA §77-8a-l(l) 
UCA §77-13-1 
UCA §77-13-3 
UCA §78-2a-3(2)(d) 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(b) 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(c) 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(e) 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.8(a) 
Utah State Constitution, Article I Section 7 
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Utah Code Section 76-5-103 Page 1 of 1 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and 
he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon 
as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
Amended by Chapter 291,1995 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76_05010.ZIP 1,915 Bytes 
Sections in this Chapter]Chapters in this Title|AU TitleslLegislative Home Page 
Last revised: Thursday, November 29,2007 
Utah (Jode Section 76-5-112 Page 1 of 1 
76-5-112. Reckless endangerment — Penalty. 
(1) A person commits reckless endangerment if, under circumstances not amounting to a felony 
offense, the person recklessly engages in conduct that creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily 
injury to another person. 
(2) Reckless endangerment is a class A misdemeanor. 
Enacted by Chapter 66,1999 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76_05024.ZIP 1,723 Bytes 
Sections in this ChapterjChapters in this Title|AU TitleslLegislative Home Page 
Last revised: Thursday, November 29,2007 
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Utah Code Section 76-10-528 Page 1 of 1 
76-10-528. Carrying a dangerous weapon while under influence of alcohol or drugs unlawful. 
(1) Any person who carries a dangerous weapon while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled 
substance as defined in Section 58-37-2 is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Under the influence means 
the same level of influence or blood or breath alcohol concentration as provided in Subsections 41-6a-
502(l)(a)(i) through (iii). 
(2) It is not a defense to prosecution under this section that the person: 
(a) is licensed in the pursuit of wildlife of any kind; or 
(b) has a valid permit to carry a concealed firearm. 
Amended by Chapter 2,2005 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76_0C056.ZIP 2,079 Bytes 
Sections in this Chapter]Chapters in this Title] All Titles|Legislative Home Page 
Last revised: Thursday, November 29,2007 
Utah Code Section 77-13-1 Page 1 of 1 
77-13-1. Kinds of pleas. 
(1) There are five kinds of pleas to an indictment or information: 
(a) not guilty; 
(b) guilty; 
(c) no contest; 
(d) not guilty by reason of insanity; and 
(e) guilty and mentally ill at the time of the offense. 
(2) An alternative plea of not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity may be entered. 
Amended by Chapter 306,2007 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 77_0E002.ZIP 2,011 Bytes 
Sections in this ChapterlChapters in this TitlelAU TitleslLegislative Home Page 
Last revised: Monday, April 30, 2007 
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Utah Code Section 77-13-3 Page 1 of 1 
77-13-3, Court approval of no contest plea required. 
A plea of no contest may be entered by the accused only upon approval of the court and only after 
due consideration of the views of the parties and the interest of the public in the effective administration 
ofjustice. 
Enacted by Chapter 15,1980 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 77_0E004.ZIP 1,658 Bytes 
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and 
process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, 
over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or 
appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the 
Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of 
Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the 
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; 
and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a charge 
of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or charge of 
a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or 
serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the 
sentence for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board 
of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, 
divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and 
paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court may 
certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any matter over which the 
Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
Amended by Chapter 302, 2001 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 255, 2001 General Session 
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Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant 
waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable 
time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A 
defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if 
a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to make 
bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea 
until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, 
the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the 
prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these 
rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial 
the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the 
plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was 
actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of 
the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has 
been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting 
these factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents 
of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has 
been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral 
consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty 
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and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a 
motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request or recommend the 
acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved 
or rejected by the court. 
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that any 
recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement being made by the prosecuting 
attorney. 
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the 
disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the judge 
shall advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, 
guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the 
adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to 
withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other requirements of this rule, the court 
shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code 
Ann.§77-16a-103. 
(k) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole. Any variance from the 
procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with 
this rule is not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea. 
Advisory Committee Notes 
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Rule 3.8. Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor. 
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall 
(a) Refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause, 
(b) Make reasonable efforts to ensure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for 
obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel, 
(c) Not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights, such as the right to a 
preliminary hearing, 
(d) Make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate 
the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense all 
unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this 
responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal, and 
(e) Exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons 
assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the 
prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 3 6 
Comment 
[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate This responsibility 
carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon 
the basis of sufficient evidence Precisely how far the prosecutor is required to go in this direction is a matter of debate 
and varies in different jurisdictions See Rule 3 3(d), governing ex parte proceedings, among which grand jury 
proceedings are included Applicable law may require other measures by the prosecutor and knowing disregard of 
those obligations or systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion could constitute a violation of Rule 8 4 
[2] Paragraph (c) does not apply to an accused appearing pro se with the approval of the tnbunal Nor does it forbid the 
lawful questioning of a suspect who has knowingly waived the rights to counsel and silence 
[3] The exception in paragraph (d) recognizes that a prosecutor may seek an appropriate protective order from the 
tribunal if disclosure of information to the defense could result in substantial harm to an individual or to the public 
interest 
[3a] Utah has not adopted the ABA version of Rule 3 8 ABA Model Rule 3 8(d), requiring the prosecution to inform the 
tribunal of mitigating information related to sentencing, creates an unreasonable burden and is not deemed workable 
where the same information is required to be disclosed to the defense counsel who should be in the best position to 
decide what to present to the tribunal The ABA's paragraph (e) regarding limitations on subpoenaing lawyers to grand 
juries or other legal proceedings is viewed as unnecessary, as there are adequate safeguards in place for federal 
prosecutors, and the Utah criminal justice system does not typically use the grand jury procedure Utah has not 
adopted the ABA's proposed paragraph (f), because the changes are either unnecessary because of, or are potentially 
inconsistent with, the provisions of Rule 3 6 
Utah Code Section Article 1, Section 7 Page 1 of 1 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
No History for Constitution 
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